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SINNERS OR SAINTS: CHILD SOLDIERS 
AND THE PERSECUTOR BAR TO ASYLUM 
AFTER NEGUSIE v. HOLDER 
Bryan Lonegan* 
Abstract: There are an estimated 250,000 child soldiers—boys and girls 
under the age of eighteen—who are being compelled to serve in more 
than fifteen conflicts worldwide. Child soldiers are forcibly recruited or 
abducted and are used as combatants, messengers, porters, cooks, and to 
provide sexual services. International law now recognizes child soldiers as 
victims of war crimes, deserving of state compassion. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, however, has opposed asylum for child sol-
diers on the grounds that their military service subjects them to the “per-
secutor bar.” Barring child soldiers from asylum protection penalizes 
them for having been the victims of a crime and undercuts all efforts to 
protect them. This Article argues that a per se bar of child soldiers from 
asylum contradicts the United States’ adherence to the international view 
that the use of child soldiers constitutes a violation of human rights, do-
mestic laws declaring recruitment of child soldiers a crime, and active 
support of the eradication of the use of child soldiers. Instead, child sol-
diers should be able to argue that their conduct falls beyond the scope 
and intent of the persecutor bar. This Article concludes by offering an 
approach to determine when a child solider should be subjected to the 
persecutor bar that balances the seriousness of the child soldier’s actions 
against the circumstances under which he or she was recruited. 
Introduction 
 In 2004, Salifou Yankene was fifteen years old when armed forces 
from the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire raided the refugee 
camp where Salifou, his mother, and his siblings had lived since Salifou’s 
father and sister were gunned down outside their home three years be-
                                                                                                                      
* Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author 
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fore.1 When the soldiers grabbed Salifou and his younger brother Ab-
dul, their mother grabbed hold of Abdul’s arm.2 Because of their moth-
er’s resistance, the soldiers cut off Abdul’s hand in full view of Salifou.3 
 For the next two years, Salifou lived and fought with the rebel 
forces.4 On pain of death, he participated in raids where he looted, 
fired upon people, abducted new child soldier recruits, and hit and 
kicked people without mercy.5 Through bribery and stealth, Salifou’s 
mother arranged for his escape from the rebel group and his flight to 
the United States, where he sought asylum.6 
 An immigration judge found Salifou’s claim of forced conscription 
to be credible and granted his asylum application.7 The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), however, appealed the ruling.8 DHS argued 
that, by virtue of his actions as a child soldier, Salifou was a “persecutor” 
and thus statutorily barred from receiving the protection of the United 
States.9 This argument is, at best, problematic. 
 Under international law, the term “child soldier” applies to any 
person under age eighteen who either “take[s] a direct part in hostili-
ties” as a member of governmental armed forces; has been “compulso-
rily recruited into [governmental] armed forces;” has been “re-
cruit[ed] or use[d] in hostilities” by armed forces distinct from the 
armed forces of a state; or is under sixteen and voluntarily recruited 
into armed service.10 In 2007, child soldiers actively fought in more 
                                                                                                                      
1 Nina Bernstein, Taking the War Out of a Child Soldier, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2007, at M29. 
The Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire was a rebel group that fought in the civil war 
raging in Côte d’Ivoire. See id. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Bernstein, supra note 1. 
7 See id.; U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, United States of America: Com-
pliance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, Hum. Rts. Watch, 10 (Nov. 2007), http://www.hrw.org/pub/ 
2007/us/US_OP_alternative_report112107.pdf. 
8 See U.S. Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, supra note 7, at 10. 
9 See id. The author is counsel to Yankene in these proceedings. 
10 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and 
Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, arts. 2, 4(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 
(May 25, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict]; Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 77, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after Geneva Protocol I]; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, opened for signature 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
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than fifteen different countries around the world.11 The United Na-
tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that up to 250,000 child 
soldiers currently participate in armed conflict.12 
 The international community recognizes child soldiers as victims 
that deserve state compassion and care.13 To the narrow extent that the 
international community has recognized the limited culpability of chil-
dren for acts carried out as combatants, it does so with a priority placed 
on rehabilitation and reintegration into society, not punishment.14 
Over 150 countries have ratified treaties prohibiting the recruitment or 
use of children under the age of fifteen as soldiers; these treaties firmly 
and unambiguously identify such recruitment as a war crime and a 
crime against humanity.15 
 The United States, through Congress’s ratification of these inter-
national treaties, has fully embraced the notion that the recruitment of 
child soldiers is a war crime.16 In addition, Congress has made the re-
cruitment of child soldiers a violation of domestic law as well as 
                                                                                                                      
11 See U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 
¶¶ 172–73, U.N. Doc. A/62/609–S/2007/757 (Dec. 21, 2007); see also Susan Tiefenbrun, 
Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 Fordham Int’l L.J. 415, 422 (2008). 
12 Press Release, UNICEF, Paris Conference “Free Children from War” (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_38208.html; see Tiefenbrun, supra note 11, at 421. 
13 See Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. La Verne L. Rev. 
56, 70 (2008). 
14 See id. at 70–72. See generally CRC, supra note 10, art. 38 (outlining the legal rights 
and protections to which children who are affected by armed conflict are entitled). 
15 See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimina-
tion of the Worst Forms of Child Labour arts. 3, 7, adopted June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 
161 [hereinafter Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention]; CRC, supra note 10, art. 38; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(3), adopted 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol II]; Geneva Protocol I, supra 
note 10, art. 77; see also Status of the Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immedi-
ate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, United Nations, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028008ccbd (last visited Jan. 
20, 2011); Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, http:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011); Status of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I), United Nations, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid 
=08000002800f3586 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011); Status of the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), United Nations, http://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3cb8 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
16 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Ratification of Optional Protocols to the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (Dec. 23, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 
ps/2002/16198.htm; see also Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 15, arts. 
3, 7. 
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grounds for deportation.17 Moreover, the United States has been a lead-
ing donor to the effort to rehabilitate child soldiers.18 
 Given the adherence of the United States to the international view 
that the use of child soldiers constitutes a violation of human rights, the 
U.S. domestic laws declaring child soldier recruitment a crime, and the 
nation’s active support for eradicating the use of child soldiers, DHS’s 
position that child soldiers are persecutors is paradoxical.19 Barring 
child soldiers from asylum protection penalizes them for having been 
the victims of a crime and undercuts all of the United States’ efforts to 
protect them. Therefore, asylum is an important weapon in the fight 
against the exploitation of child soldiers. 
 Domestic law allows the attorney general to grant asylum to any-
one who falls within the definition of a “refugee.”20 The definition of 
refugee, however, does not apply to anyone who “incited, assisted, or 
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”21 In applying this “persecutor bar,” the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA or “Board”) and federal circuit courts have 
relied on Fedorenko v. United States, which held that the post-World War 
II legislation known as the Displaced Persons Act did not create a vol-
untariness exception to the persecutor bar.22 Reliance on Fedorenko as a 
guide for interpreting the persecutor bar caused conflicting results.23 
On March 3, 2009, however, the Supreme Court held in Negusie v. Hold-
er that the Board’s reliance on Fedorenko was misplaced; Fedorenko, the 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, § 2, 122 Stat. 
3735, 3735 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442 (West Supp. 2010)). 
18 See Report of U.S. to U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Re-
ports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 8, Paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Con-
flict, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/USA/1 ( June 22, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Report on 
the Optional Protocol]; see also Happold, supra note 13, at 64. 
19 See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008 § 2; U.S. Report on the Optional Pro-
tocol, supra note 18, ¶ 34; Happold, supra note 13, at 64; supra notes 8–9, 16–18 and ac-
companying text. 
20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining a refu-
gee as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country on account of a 
well-founded fear of persecution due to the person’s race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a social group, or political opinion). 
21 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i). 
22 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). 
23 See infra Part II. 
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Court found, concerned a different statutory construction.24 Applying 
the first step of Chevron deference, the Court held that the persecutor 
statute was ambiguous and it remanded the case to the Board to recon-
sider under the current statutory framework.25 
 This Article argues that special provisions must be made to address 
the application of the persecutor bar to child soldiers. Even if the 
Board decides that there is no voluntariness defense to the persecutor 
bar, the development of both international customary and U.S. domes-
tic laws regarding the use of child soldiers, the fact that child soldiers 
are recognized as victims worthy of protection, and traditional notions 
of the diminished responsibility of juveniles all support this conclusion. 
Part I briefly discusses the problems related to establishing a claim to 
asylum for a child soldier. Part II discusses the persecutor bar in general 
and its applicability to the circumstances of child soldiers. Lastly, Part 
III offers a simple approach for applying the persecutor bar to child 
soldiers applying for asylum in the United States. 
I. The Eligibility of Child Soldiers for Asylum 
 Before reaching the issue of whether a child soldier is precluded 
from asylum as a persecutor, it is worth briefly exploring on what 
grounds a child soldier would be eligible for asylum in the first place. 
To prevail on an asylum claim, the applicant must show either actual 
persecution in the past on account of a protected ground or a well-
founded fear of persecution in the future on account of a protected 
ground.26 Thus, child soldiers are confronted with two threshold issues: 
First, establishing that someone has persecuted or likely will persecute 
them; and second, proving that the persecution was or would be based 
on a protected ground.27 
 Persecution has been defined as “‘threats to life, confinement, tor-
ture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real 
threat to life or freedom.’”28 General upheaval resulting from civil strife 
or war is insufficient to establish persecution.29 Further, required ser-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163, 1165 (2009). Prior to the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the case was called Negusie v. Mukasey. The name changed when, after 
Michael Mukasey, Eric H. Holder, Jr. became the Attorney General of the United States. 
25 See id. at 1164, 1167. 
26 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); e.g., In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 17 (B.I.A. 1989). 
27 See, e.g., Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 17. 
28 Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 
1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
29 See, e.g., In re Sanchez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276, 287–88 (B.I.A. 1985). 
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vice in a nation’s military generally does not constitute persecution.30 
Similarly, fear of forced conscription into a guerilla organization by it-
self is not persecution.31 A person who fears punishment for desertion, 
however, may qualify for asylum if they can establish that they would 
have been compelled to perform an act that was illegal under interna-
tional law.32 Thus, a former child soldier could establish persecution by 
showing that he or she deserted because others compelled him or her 
to commit atrocities.33 But requiring child soldiers to prove that they 
committed atrocities, or would have been required to commit atrocities 
if they remained, misses the point: International law establishes that it 
is intrinsically wrong and detrimental to children’s well-being to com-
pel them to fight regardless of whether the fighting involves commit-
ting bad acts.34 
 The next conundrum faced by child soldiers seeking asylum is that 
U.S. courts have declined to find that they were persecuted on account 
of a protected characteristic despite universal acknowledgement that 
they are victims of human rights abuses.35 The BIA has defined “a par-
ticular social group” —the pertinent protected characteristic here—as 
“a group of persons [who] share a common, immutable characteristic” 
such as sex, color, kinship, or a shared past experience like “former mil-
itary leadership or land ownership.”36 Consequently, some courts have 
held that age cannot form the basis for defining a social group because 
“unlike innate characteristics, such as sex or color, age changes over 
time, possibly lessening its role in personal identity.”37 
                                                                                                                      
30 See, e.g., M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re A-G-, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 502, 506 (B.I.A. 1987). 
31 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). 
32 See, e.g., A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 506. 
33 See, e.g., id. 
34 See infra Part II.A. 
35 See Lukwago v. Aschroft, 329 F.3d 157, 183 (3d Cir. 2003); see also supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
36 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Moghar-
rabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that to establish a social group, an 
applicant for asylum must show that: (1) he possesses a characteristic which the persecutor 
seeks to overcome in others; (2) the persecutor knows of the characteristic or could be-
come aware of it; (3) the persecutor has the power to punish the characteristic; and (4) 
the persecutor has the inclination to punish the characteristic). 
37 Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171. The Lukwago court declined to find that “children from 
Northern Uganda who are abducted and enslaved . . . and oppose their involuntary servi-
tude” were a particular social group. Id. at 167. The court also rejected the argument that 
forced recruitment could be the basis for finding a social group because “a ‘particular 
social group’ must exist independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for 
asylum.” Id. at 172. In a subsequent decision regarding a victim of trafficking, the Third 
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 This reasoning is flawed because it fails to acknowledge that at the 
time of the past persecution, the child’s age was immutable.38 Although 
each child will ultimately age out of the condition that makes them ex-
ploitable, “[a] child is clearly unable to disassociate him/herself from 
his/her age in order to avoid the persecution . . . .”39 The U.S. courts’ 
myopic view of age is also a consequence of federal regulations regard-
ing the likelihood of future persecution.40 The relevant regulations 
state that past persecution creates a presumption of future persecution, 
but that the government can overcome this presumption by showing 
that circumstances have changed such that an applicant who has suf-
fered past persecution has no basis to fear future harm.41 Arguably, 
these “future persecution” regulations, which make granting asylum 
more difficult, are inapplicable: The statute expressly establishing “past 
persecution” as a basis for asylum makes no reference to risk of future 
harm.42 For example, there are several forms of harm, such as forced 
sterilization and female genital mutilation, that may form the basis of 
an asylum claim even though the harm cannot be repeated.43 Further-
                                                                                                                      
Circuit explained, “This is a matter of logic: motivation must precede action; and the social 
group must exist prior to the persecution if membership in the group is to motivate the 
persecution.” Sarkisian v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 322 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2009); 
see also Cruz-Diaz v. INS, 86 F.3d 330, 331–32 (4th Cir. 1996) (sustaining the immigration 
judge’s determination that the forced conscription of the applicant by a rebel group when 
he was less than fifteen years old and his fear of arrest by the government was not based 
upon a protected ground). But see In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 583–84 (B.I.A. 2008). In 
S-E-G-, the Board stated, 
We agree with the Immigration Judge that “youth” is not an entirely immuta-
ble characteristic but is, instead, by its very nature, a temporary state that 
changes over time. . . . [H]owever, . . . the mutability of age is not within one’s 
control, and . . . if an individual has been persecuted in the past on account 
of an age-described particular social group, or faces such persecution at a 
time when that individual’s age places him within the group, a claim for asy-
lum may still be cognizable. 
Id. 
38 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum 
Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08 (Dec. 22, 2009) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Guidelines]. 
39 Id. 
40 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2010). 
41 See id. 
42 See Deborah E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States 44 (Paul T. Lufkin 
ed., 3d ed. 1999) (arguing that “an applicant who has suffered past persecution can still be 
denied asylum based on considerations of future harm” may impose requirements beyond 
what is required by statute). 
43 See In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 622 (B.I.A. 2008). 
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more, federal regulations permit granting asylum on purely humanitar-
ian grounds regardless of the possibility of future persecution if the past 
persecution was particularly egregious.44 
 Despite these difficulties, child soldiers may still establish that they 
are members of a social group if they can show that they would be sub-
ject to persecution based upon their veteran status because that status is 
not subject to change.45 For example, “membership in the group of 
former child soldiers who have escaped [Lord’s Resistance Army] cap-
tivity fits precisely within the BIA’s own recognition that a shared past 
experience may be enough to link members of a ‘particular social 
group.’”46 This possible solution, however, leads to the following ques-
tion: Are former child soldiers subject to exclusion from refugee pro-
tection because of their conduct as child soldiers? 
II. Child Soldiers and the Persecutor Bar 
 In the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress carved out an exception for 
those who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”47 This 
seemingly clear language, however, is dangerously deceptive; at least 
one court has commented that the statute “has a smooth surface be-
neath which lie[s] a series of rocks.”48 
 Until recently, courts interpreted the statute in light of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Fedorenko v. United States, which upheld the 
denaturalization of Feodor Fedorenko, who had originally entered the 
United States as a refugee pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) 
of 1948.49 In both his application under the DPA and subsequent natu-
                                                                                                                      
44 See In re S-A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464, 465–66 (B.I.A. 2008). 
45 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 178–79. Jurists in Great Britain, however, have expressed 
skepticism as to whether a former child soldier would be recognized and hence subject to 
retribution when time would naturally alter his or her appearance. See AJ (Liber.) v. Sec‘y 
of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1736, [¶ 3] (Eng.), available at http:// 
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1736.html. 
46 See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 178. The Lord’s Resistance Army is “a rebel force that op-
poses the Ugandan government” and that has a “well-documented” practice of abducting 
children to serve as child solders. Id. at 164, 172. 
47 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). 
48 Casteñeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
49 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981). The DPA “specifically ex-
cluded individuals who had [either] ‘assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]’ or had 
‘voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their operations . . . .’” Id. (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Annex I, 
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ralization application, Fedorenko willfully failed to disclose that he had 
served as a guard in the Treblinka concentration camp, which would 
have barred his entry into the United States under the DPA.50 For his 
part, Fedorenko—who was initially a Russian prisoner of war but later 
served the Germans—admitted serving as a guard, but claimed that the 
Germans forced him to do so and denied any involvement in the atroc-
ities committed at the camp.51 
 The Court refused to read a voluntariness exception into the 
DPA.52 Nevertheless, the Court noted that, without a voluntariness ex-
ception, the DPA would bar “‘every Jewish prisoner who survived Treb-
linka because each one of them assisted the SS in the operation of the 
camp.’”53 Specifically, the “working prisoners [who] led arriving pris-
oners to the lazaret where they were murdered, cut the hair of the 
women who were to be executed, or played in the orchestra at the gate 
to the camp as part of the Germans’ ruse to persuade new arrivals that 
the camp was other than what it was.”54 In a critical footnote, the Court 
stated that the solution 
lies, not in “interpreting” the Act to include a voluntariness 
requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but in fo-
cusing on whether particular conduct can be considered as-
sisting in the persecution of civilians. Thus, an individual who 
did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they 
were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the perse-
cution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no ques-
tion that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a 
rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly al-
lowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby vil-
                                                                                                                      
Part II, § 2(a)–(b), opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-
ter IRO Constitution]). 
50 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 500. 
51 See id. 
52 Id. at 512–14. In denying Fedorenko’s involuntariness defense, the Court took no-
tice of the difference between the two statutory preclusions for eligibility under the DPA. 
See id. at 512. Whereas section 2(a) precluded those who “assisted the enemy in persecut-
ing civil[ians],” section 2(b) precluded those who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . 
in their operations . . . .” See id. at 509–10, 512 (alteration in original) (quoting IRO Con-
stitution, supra note 49, Annex I, Part II, § 2(a)–(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Court held that the omission of the word “voluntarily” from section 2(a) meant that 
all persons who assisted the enemy in persecution were ineligible, regardless of voluntari-
ness. See id. 
53 See id. at 511 n.33 (quoting United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 913 (S.D. 
Fla. 1978), rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d, 449 U.S. 490 (1981)). 
54 Id. 
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lage, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on 
orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the sta-
tutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution 
of civilians.55 
 While Fedorenko seemingly requires a straightforward line-drawing 
analysis where the court need only determine whether an individual’s 
conduct advanced the group’s persecutory goals, courts have struggled 
to find the boundary “between the extremes of the death camp barber 
and the weapon wielding guard.”56 One view holds that Fedorenko re-
quires that “in assessing the character of the individual’s conduct, we 
look not to the voluntariness of the person’s actions, but to his behavior 
as a whole. Where the conduct was active and had direct consequences 
for the victims, we conclude that it was ‘assistance in persecution.’”57 
Under this approach, it is purely the objective effect on the victim that 
counts. For example, the Fifth Circuit held in Bah v. Ashcroft that where 
the alien admitted to killing a prisoner and chopping off the hands of 
civilians, his personal motivation was not relevant even though he was 
forced to join a rebel group after the group had murdered his father 
and sister and threatened him with death.58 
                                                                                                                      
55 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34. Following Fedorenko’s denaturalization, the govern-
ment brought a second action to deport him under the Holtzman Amendment to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act (INA) as one who had assisted the Nazis in the persecution of 
others. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2006); In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 59–60 
(B.I.A. 1984). Although Fedorenko argued that the statutory issue present in his denaturali-
zation under the DPA was not present in his deportation under the INA, the Board held that 
his motivation was irrelevant to his deportation. See Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 69. 
56 United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a Latvian po-
lice officer who performed various ministerial duties for the Nazis was not a persecutor); 
cf. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 447–48 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that a Latvian police 
chief who ordered arrests at the direction of the Nazis was a persecutor). 
57 Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a driver for the Chinese 
health department was a persecutor where one of his duties was to drive pregnant women 
to hospitals for forced abortions). Mere membership in an organization that persecutes 
others on account of a protected ground, however, is insufficient to bar relief unless “one’s 
actions or inaction furthers that persecution in some way.” In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 811, 814–15 (B.I.A. 1988). Nevertheless, one does not have to actually pull the 
trigger to further the group’s persecutory intent. See In re A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 784–85 
(B.I.A. 2005) (finding that a political movement’s leader-in-exile may have “incited,” “as-
sisted,” or “participated in” acts of persecution in the home country by an armed group 
connected to that political movement). At the very least, the person has to know that his 
conduct furthers persecution. See Casteñeda-Castillo, 488 F.3d at 22 (holding that the perse-
cutor bar would presumptively not apply to a former army officer who testified—and 
whose testimony was believed—that he was unaware of a civilian massacre during a military 
operation in which he was ordered to block escape routes from the village). 
58 See Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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 Alternatively, the Eighth Circuit has held that Fedorenko requires “a 
particularized evaluation in order to determine whether an individual’s 
behavior was culpable to such a degree that he could be fairly deemed 
to have assisted or participated in persecution.”59 In Hernandez v. Reno, 
the court found that even when an asylum applicant, who had been 
forcibly conscripted into a rebel group, participated in a firing squad 
that killed one hundred villagers suspected of supporting the govern-
ment, he may have not persecuted others.60 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court contrasted the circumstances of Hernandez’s conduct 
with Fedorenko’s conduct.61 The court noted that Fedorenko was at 
times free to leave Treblinka and never tried to escape, served over one 
year, was paid and rewarded, outnumbered the Germans (with the oth-
er Ukrainian guards), and lied about his service to U.S. authorities.62 
On the contrary, Hernandez was never granted leave, escaped at the 
earliest opportunity, received no pay, risked his life in opposing the 
group’s tactics and refusing orders, was isolated, and fully revealed his 
involvement to U.S. officials.63 
 No reported cases, however, have directly dealt with the proper 
application of the Fedorenko analysis to child soldiers. To the limited ex-
tent that the Board has considered the issue, it has done so in non-
precedential, unpublished decisions that cleave toward Hernandez.64 
One Board member opined that in considering the claim of a child 
soldier, factors relevant in determining his culpability include “his age 
at the time of the events in question, the threats and coercion he faced 
from adult superiors, his fear of being killed should he have refused to 
act as ordered, and his candid and honest testimony about his involve-
ment in the deaths of . . . civilians.”65 Another Board member has 
found that, 
because the respondent was a boy between the ages of 11 and 
13 during the relevant period, we are not persuaded that he 
                                                                                                                      
59 Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2001). 
60 See id. at 815 (remanding to the BIA with instructions to apply the Fedorenko analysis 
to determine whether the asylum applicant had assisted in the persecution of others). 
61 See id. at 814. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See, e.g., Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596, 600 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing an 
unpublished BIA decision which concluded that the “[p]etitioner did not participate or 
assist in the persecution of others”); In re E-O-, slip op. at 1 (B.I.A. July 12, 2006) (unpub-
lished decision) (on file with author); In re Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr. B1-170, B1-178 (B.I.A. 
Feb. 20, 2003) (Espenoza, J., concurring). 
65 Kebede, 26 Immig. Rptr. at B1-178. 
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had the requisite personal culpability for ordering, inciting, 
assisting, or otherwise participating in the persecution of oth-
ers on account of a protected ground as a former child soldier 
in the [Lord’s Resistance Army].66 
In another decision, the Board held that a child soldier was not a per-
secutor simply because of duress.67 For its part, DHS has conceded that 
child soldiers present a different scenario from that of adults, albeit 
one requiring resolution by Congress.68 
 In March 2009, the Supreme Court finally clarified that Fedorenko 
was not controlling with respect to the persecutor bar because it in-
volved a completely different statutory scheme.69 In Negusie v. Holder, the 
Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act’s persecutor bar 
was ambiguous with respect to “whether coercion or duress is relevant in 
determining if an alien assisted or otherwise participated in persecu-
tion,” and that Chevron deference required that the agency address the 
issue in the first instance.70 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia 
noted that the agency could retain a rule precluding a voluntariness de-
fense.71 Justice Stevens dissented, finding that a duress exception was 
necessary for the United States to comply with the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) interpretation of the U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees.72 
 So the question remains: Can a child soldier be guilty of persecut-
ing others? Negusie presents the BIA with a clean slate on which it may 
draft an answer.73 Even if the Board follows Justice Scalia’s observation 
that it may be reasonable to interpret the term “persecution” so as to 
                                                                                                                      
66 E-O-, slip op. at 1. 
67 See Sackie, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (discussing BIA decision). 
68 See Brief for the Respondent at 24 n.18, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) 
(No. 07-499). 
69 See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1166. 
70 Id. at 1164. 
71 See id. at 1169–70 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia offered three reasons for do-
ing so: First, “[t]he culpability of one who harms another under coercion is, and has always 
been, a subject of intense debate, raising profound questions of moral philosophy and 
individual responsibility” and duress is not a defense to intentional killings in common law 
or for soldiers following military orders they know are unlawful. Id. at 1169. Second, “in 
the context of immigration law, ‘culpability’ as a relevant factor in determining admissibil-
ity is only one facet of a more general consideration: desirability. And there may well be 
reasons to think that those who persecuted others, even under duress, would be relatively 
undesirable as immigrants.” Id. Finally, “a bright-line rule excluding all persecutors—
whether acting under coercion or not—might still be the best way for the agency to effec-
tuate the statutory scheme.” Id. 
72 See id. at 1175 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
73 See id. at 1167 (majority opinion). 
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exclude a voluntariness exception, as a general matter, child soldiers 
present a unique case where a per se bar would contradict both inter-
pretations of international law by the United States as well as domestic 
legislation.74 
A. A Per Se Bar to Asylum for Child Soldiers Would Contradict the United 
States’ Adherence to the International View That Child Soldiers  
Are Victims of Human Rights Abuse 
 Since 1924, international law has recognized the vulnerability of 
children and has afforded them special rights and protections during 
times of armed conflict.75 It was not until the two 1977 Additional Pro-
tocols to the Geneva Conventions, however, that international law spe-
cifically addressed children as combatants.76 Protocol I established that 
“[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected 
against any form of indecent assault” and prohibited the involvement 
of children in international conflicts.77 Protocol II extended this prin-
ciple to non-international armed conflict such as civil wars, and states, 
“Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither 
be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities.”78 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1168–69 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Child Soldiers Ac-
countability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, § 2, 122 Stat. 3735, 3735 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442 (West Supp. 2010)); U.S. Report on the Optional Protocol, supra note 
18, ¶ 34; Happold, supra note 13, at 64; supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
75 See Mark Ensalaco, The Rights of the Child to Development, in Children’s Human Rights: 
Progress and Challenges for Children Worldwide 9, 10 (Mark Ensalaco & Linda C. 
Majka eds., 2005); Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Legal Protection of Children in Armed 
Conflicts, 43 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 809, 810–11 (1994). To the extent that protection was af-
forded to children, it was as a vulnerable segment of society and not as participants in war. See 
Ensalaco, supra, at 10; Van Bueren, supra, at 810–11. For example, the Geneva Convention of 
1949 contains several specific provisions granting children certain privileges by reason of age 
in times of armed conflict. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention] (excluding persons under eighteen from enlistment or forced labor by 
occupying power); see also Alison Dundes Renteln, The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing 
International Standards, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 191, 193 (1999). 
76 See Renteln, supra note 75, at 193. 
77 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 77(1)–(3). Protocol I is now considered to re-
flect customary international law. See Renteln, supra note 75, at 194. 
78 Geneva Protocol II, supra note 15, art. 4(3)(c); see Renteln, supra note 75, at 193–94. 
Many states, however, deny the applicability of Protocol I to their internal conflicts by argu-
ing that they are mere domestic disturbances. See Ilene Cohn & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, 
Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict 60 (1994); Renteln, supra 
note 75, at 194. 
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 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) also sets the 
minimum age for acceptable recruitment into the armed forces at fif-
teen.79 Similarly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) declares that “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to partici-
pate actively in hostilities” constitutes a “war crime.”80 Further, the In-
ternational Labour Organization Convention on the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child La-
bor defines the worst forms of child labor to include “[a]ll forms of slav-
ery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of 
children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, 
including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in 
armed conflict.”81 Finally, in 2000, the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict required that “States Parties . . . take all feasible meas-
ures” to prevent soldiers under eighteen years old from taking part in 
combat.82 The Optional Protocol also prohibits compulsory service in 
government forces by persons under eighteen and raises the minimum 
age for voluntary recruitment “from that set out in article 38, paragraph 
3, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” which is fifteen.83 
Thus, the Optional Protocol “raises the minimum age of recruitment 
[into government forces] to sixteen, if in a rather opaque manner.”84 
Non-government armed groups are barred from recruiting those under 
eighteen under any circumstance.85 Finally, the Optional Protocol also 
                                                                                                                      
79 See CRC, supra note 10, art. 38. While fifteen years is the minimum age for recruitment 
into the armed forces, states are urged to give priority to the oldest individuals. See id. 
80 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), adopted July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
81 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 15, art. 3(a). Although not di-
rected specifically toward child soldiers, treaties aimed at the eradication of slavery and hu-
man trafficking encompass the child soldier phenomenon, including the International Co-
venant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime; and the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 
11, at 449–56; see also P.W. Singer, Talk Is Cheap: Getting Serious About Preventing Child Soldiers, 37 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 561, 568–70 (2004). 
82 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 10, Annex I, art. 1. 
83 Id. Annex I, arts. 2, 3(1). 
84 Happold, supra note 13, at 66. 
85 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 10, Annex I, art. 4(1). 
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obliges States Parties to cooperate in the “rehabilitation and social rein-
tegration” of persons recruited in a manner contrary to the protocol.86 
 While not a party to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, the United States has indicated that it considers their 
provisions relating to children in armed conflict to reflect customary 
international law.87 More importantly, the United States has ratified 
both the Optional Protocol and Worst Forms of Child Labour Conven-
tions—the two primary treaties prohibiting the forced recruitment of 
child soldiers.88 Thus, the United States recognizes child soldiers as vic-
tims of human rights abuses and crimes as a matter of domestic law.89 
 Further, in October 2008, Congress enacted the Child Soldiers Ac-
countability Act which amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
declare any alien who has engaged in the recruitment or use of child 
soldiers removable.90 Significantly, when introducing the Act, Senator 
Richard Durbin stated: 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. Annex I, art. 7(1). The international community’s efforts to outlaw the exploitation 
of child soldiers finally obtained some level of credibility on January 29, 2007, when the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) initiated its first war crime trial based on the forced re-
cruitment of children against Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. See Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶¶ 9–11 ( Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone’s conviction of three former commanders of the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council for the illegal recruitment and abuse of child soldiers repre-
sented another milestone. See Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 14(iii) (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.sc-sl.org/cases/ProsecutorBrimaKamaraand 
KanuAFRCCase/AppealJudgment/tabid/216/default.aspx. The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone was established pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolution. See U.N. Secretary-
General, The Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court Report]. 
87 See Happold, supra note 13, at 63; see Martin D. Dupuis et al., The Sixth Annual Ameri-
can Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Work-
shop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, 2 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 415, 420 (1987) (Remarks of Michael J. Matheson). 
88 Happold, supra note 13, at 63–64; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra 
note 16; Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., U.S. Ratifies ILO Convention Against the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (Dec. 2, 1999), http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_ 
and_public_information/Press_releases/lang--en/WCMS_071320/index.htm. The U.S. Sen-
ate ratified the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention on December 2, 1999 and the 
Optional Protocol on December 23, 2002. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 
16; Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., supra. 
89 See Happold, supra note 13, at 63–64; see also Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., supra 
note 88; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 16. 
90 See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, § 2, 122 Stat. 
3735, 3735 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442 (West Supp. 2010)); see also 154 
Cong. Rec. S8513 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2008) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
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Recognizing that perpetrators often use drugs, threats, vio-
lence or other means to pressure child soldiers into commit-
ting serious human rights violations, including the recruit-
ment of other children, this legislation seeks to hold adults 
accountable for their actions and is not intended to make in-
admissible or deportable child soldiers who participated in 
the recruitment of other children. This legislation should not 
be interpreted as placing new restrictions on or altering the 
legal status of former child soldiers who are seeking admission 
to or are already present in the United States.91 
The Act also criminalizes the recruitment of children under the age of 
fifteen and allows the United States to prosecute individuals in the 
United States who have recruited children, even if the recruitment 
took place in other countries.92 
 Similarly, because “[c]hild soldiers are children who are trafficked 
into exploitative and dangerous forms of work performed under slave-
like conditions,” former child soldiers trafficked into the United States 
would be protected under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA).93 The TVPA defines trafficking victims as persons who are held 
against their will “for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, 
or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, pe-
onage, debt bondage, or slavery.”94 Moreover, state anti-human traffick-
ing laws, such as that of New York, specifically exclude trafficking vic-
tims from prosecution as accomplices.95 This creates a potential conflict 
of laws.96 It is well established that “[w]here the statute in question was 
enacted for the protection of certain defined persons thought to be in 
need of special protection, it would clearly be contrary to the legislative 
purpose to impose accomplice liability upon such a person.”97 This evi-
                                                                                                                      
91 154 Cong. Rec. S8514 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2008) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
92 See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008 § 2. 
93 See Tiefenbrun, supra note 11, at 449. 
94 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(B) (2006); see Tiefenbrun, supra note 11, at 452. 
95 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 135.36 (McKinney 2009) (“In a prosecution for labor traf-
ficking, a person who has been compelled or induced or recruited, enticed, harbored or 
transported to engage in labor shall not be deemed to be an accomplice.”). 
96 Compare Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008 § 2 (imposing liability on persons 
who attempt or conspire to recruit child soldiers), with Tiefenbrun, supra note 11, at 449 
(noting that the TVPA protects victims of trafficking), and Penal § 135.36 (excluding vic-
tims of trafficking from liability as accomplices). 
97 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 693 (4th ed. 2003). Thus, a woman willingly trans-
ported across state lines for the purpose of prostitution cannot be charged as an accomplice 
in violation of the Mann Act. See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 118–20, 123 (1932). 
Nor can a victim of statutory rape be an accomplice to that crime. See In re Meagan R., 49 Cal. 
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dence overwhelmingly suggests that Congress has recognized child sol-
diers as a protected class. 
B. A Per Se Bar to Asylum for Child Soldiers Does Not Conform  
with the Refugee Protocol 
 The principles of refugee protection that underlie the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol are subject to limited exceptions contained in 
Article 1F of the Convention.98 These exceptions aim to exclude from 
refugee protection those persons who have committed offenses so 
grave that they are considered undeserving of safe harbor.99 Article 1F 
provides, in pertinent part: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any per-
son with respect to whom there are serious reasons for con-
sidering that: 
 (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or 
a crime against humanity . . . ; 
 (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside 
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee; 
 (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.100 
 According to the interpretation of the UNHCR, the third excep-
tion for acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations applies only 
to persons in high positions of authority representing a state or state-like 
                                                                                                                      
Rptr. 2d 325, 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, it is well established within the civil context 
that “‘if conduct is made criminal in order to protect a certain class of persons irrespective of 
their consent, the consent of members of that class to the conduct is not effective to bar a 
tort action.’” Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 892C (1986)). 
98 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1F, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150. 
99 See id.; see also UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 38, ¶ 58; Advisory Opinion from Edu-
ardo Arboleda, Deputy Regional Representative, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 5–
6 (Sept. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion] (on file with author). 
100 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, art. 1F. The grounds 
for exclusion enumerated in article 1F are exhaustive, meaning that they cannot be aug-
mented by additional grounds for exclusion in the absence of an international convention 
to that effect. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 38, ¶ 58. Moreover, the language of arti-
cle 1F suggests that states lack the discretion to grant protection to persons to whom the 
preclusion applies. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, art. 
1F; see also Happold, supra note 13, at 85 (discussing the discrepancies in the treatment of 
child soldiers in international and domestic law). 
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entity.101 The exclusion for “serious non-political crimes” is also inappli-
cable to child soldiers, unless the crime was linked to the armed conflict 
itself.102 Therefore, the exclusion for war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity under Article 1F(a) is the most relevant in determining whether 
a child soldier committed an excludable act during an armed conflict.103 
 War crimes, referred to as “grave breaches,” are serious violations 
of the laws and customs of war as provided under the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949.104 They include willful killing and torture, willfully caus-
ing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, hostage taking, 
wanton destruction of civilian settlements, launching indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians, forced transfer of populations, and rape.105 Crimes 
against humanity include murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation or forcible transfer, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, and apart-
heid.106 War crimes and crimes against humanity do not require proof 
of specific intent, merely the knowledge of the existence of particular 
circumstances.107 Thus, to obtain a conviction for war crimes, prosecu-
tors need only show that the defendant engaged in the proscribed con-
duct with knowledge that he or she did so within the context of an 
armed conflict.108 Crimes against humanity require knowledge that the 
prohibited conduct was part of an ongoing, systematic attack against 
civilian populations.109 
 The sad reality is that child soldiers commit atrocious acts with dis-
turbing regularity.110 Normally, these acts would unquestionably be 
deemed war crimes and crimes against humanity and thus grounds for 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 99, at 7. Some commentators have argued that a 
child soldier simply cannot form the intent necessary to commit genocide or to wage a war 
of aggression. See Happold, supra note 13, at 72; Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the 
Past: The Implications of Prosecuting Children For Participating in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 629, 644–45 (1997). 
102 Advisory Opinion, supra note 99, at 7. 
103 See id. at 6. 
104 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 75, art. 147. 
105 See Geneva Protocol II, supra note 15, art. 4(2); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 10, 
art. 85(3); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 75, art. 147. 
106 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. 
107 See Happold, supra note 13, at 72. 
108 See Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 8(2)(a); see also Claire de Than & Edwin 
Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights 121–23, 137–38 (2003). 
109 See Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 7(1); see also de Than & Shorts, supra note 
108, at 115. 
110 See Michael Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection 2–3 
(2006); Tiefenbrun, supra note 11, at 433–34. 
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exclusion if committed by adults.111 But should child soldiers be held 
accountable for war crimes or crimes against humanity and therefore 
be subject to the exclusion provisions of Article 1F(a)? 
 Although the international community has clearly and vigorously 
condemned the use of child soldiers, its approach to the treatment of 
child soldiers in light of their conduct remains ambiguous.112 While 
international law clearly establishes that the forced recruitment of a 
child soldier violates that child’s rights, it is largely silent as to the cul-
pability of a child soldier for his violation of international laws during 
the period in which his rights were violated.113 Understandably, the vic-
tims of the brutality of child soldiers are less ambiguous in their view of 
how child solders should be treated.114 Child soldiers have been tried in 
the domestic courts of several nations and even executed for crimes in 
violation of national laws committed during armed conflicts.115 Popular 
opinion in Rwanda maintained that “if a child was able to kill, if a child 
was able to discriminate between two ethnic groups, to decide who was 
a Hutu moderate and who wasn’t, and was able to carry out murder in 
that way, why should that child be considered differently from an 
adult?”116 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 98, art. 1F; Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, supra note 106, art. 6(b)–(c). 
112 See Jennifer C. Everett, The Battle Continues: Fighting for a More Child-Sensitive Approach 
to Asylum for Child Soldiers, 21 Fla. J. Int’l L. 285, 298–99 (2009); Happold, supra note 13, 
at 78–79; Renteln, supra note 75, at 199–200. 
113 See Happold, supra note 13, at 67. There is no internationally recognized minimum 
age of criminal responsibility, much less one for the violation of international law. See id. at 
78–79. Rather, the CRC requires member states to establish their own minimum age for 
criminal responsibility. See CRC, supra note 10, art. 40(3)(a); Happold, supra note 13, at 73. 
While the ICC does not have jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of eight-
een at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, this is merely a jurisdictional 
provision; it does not preclude prosecution in a national court. See Happold, supra note 13, 
at 78–79. The statutes for the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda were both silent as to a minimum age of criminal responsibility, though nei-
ther tribunal prosecuted anyone under eighteen. See id. Further, while the CRC requires 
states parties to establish a minimum age of criminal responsibility, it does not set an age 
itself—each state is left to establish its own threshold age for criminal responsibility. See 
CRC, supra note 10, art. 40(3)(a). 
114 See Wessells, supra note 110, at 218–19; Reis, supra note 101, at 634–35. 
115 See Happold, supra note 13, at 71. The government of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo executed a fourteen-year-old child soldier in 2000 and sentenced four others be-
tween the ages of fourteen and sixteen to death in 2001. Id. In 2002, the Ugandan gov-
ernment charged two child soldiers from the Lord’s Resistance Army with treason but 
withdrew the charges under international pressure. See id. 
116 Reis, supra note 101, at 634–35. In Rwanda, over one thousand children were de-
tained by national authorities and accused of participating in the genocide. See id. at 629. 
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 Dr. Matthew Happold has argued, however, that because Protocol 
II sets fifteen as the cut off age for military service, a fifteen-year-old 
should not be held accountable for his actions.117 After all, 
The right held by children under fifteen, not to be recruited 
into an armed force or group, is a welfare right based on the 
premise that military service, even if voluntary, is always con-
trary to their best interests. In consequence, the interests the 
right serves trump any autonomy interests that might be served 
by permitting children under fifteen the choice whether or not 
to volunteer.118 
Dr. Happold concedes, however, that the problem with this premise is 
that Protocol II makes no mention of a child soldier’s criminal respon-
sibility and the drafters of Protocol II specifically decided not to include 
such a provision.119 
 Nonetheless, this idea that children under fifteen lack the mental 
capacity to decide to serve, and thus cannot form the mental state re-
quired to commit international crimes, seems to have influenced the 
formation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has no jurisdic-
tion over anyone who was under fifteen years of age at the time of the 
commission of an offense.120 Those between fifteen and eighteen were 
to be 
treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account 
his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or 
her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a con-
structive role in society, and in accordance with international 
human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child.121 
The Special Court’s prosecutor quickly announced, however, that he 
would not indict persons who committed crimes as children.122 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Happold, supra note 13, at 69. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at 73–74. 
120 See Sierra Leone Special Court Report, supra note 86, ¶¶ 32–38. 
121 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145. 
122 See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Pub. Affairs Office, Special Court 
Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children (Nov. 2, 2002), http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XRwCUe%2BaVhw%3D&tabid=196. Instead, “Children impli-
cated in particularly heinous crimes are given hearings in special closed juvenile chambers 
(to keep their identity secret) and receive psychological counseling and other forms of 
assistance.” Singer, supra note 81, at 580. “Rather than having to serve sentences in prisons 
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 In sum, although it is theoretically possible for a child soldier to be 
found guilty of committing crimes that would subject him to exclusion 
under Article 1F(a), it does not occur in practice.123 Even if evidence 
indicated that a child soldier committed war crimes, the UNHCR has 
warned that any refugee status determination related to child soldiers 
must “take into account not only general exclusion principles but also 
the rules and principles that address the special status, rights, and pro-
tection afforded to children under international and national law at all 
stages of the asylum procedure.”124 These include, most notably, prin-
ciples relating to “the mental capacity of children and their ability to 
understand and consent to the acts that they are requested or ordered 
to undertake.”125 For fifteen- to eighteen-year-old child soldiers, the 
UNHCR notes that questions of immaturity, involuntary intoxication, 
duress, and self-defense arise in assessing culpability.126 
 Finally, even if it was determined that a child soldier had commit-
ted an excludable act and that he or she bore individual responsibility 
for that act, the UNHCR requires the tribunal to determine whether 
the consequences of exclusion from refugee protection are propor-
tional to the seriousness of the excludable acts.127 The proportionality 
determination requires consideration of any mitigating or aggravating 
factors including age, treatment by military personnel, or circum-
stances of service.128 
                                                                                                                      
with adult perpetrators, they are placed in special custody, rehabilitation or demobilization 
programs, and foster care.” Id. 
123 See Happold, supra note 13, at 77–78. 
124 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 38, ¶ 63. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. ¶ 64. Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via rejected the duress defense for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Prosecutor v. 
Drazen Erdemović, duress is a defense under the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. See 
Case. No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 
1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf; see also Rome 
Statute, supra note 80, art. 31(1)(d). “As stated at the Nuremberg Trials, an individual who 
is compelled against his will based on an ‘imminent, real and inevitable’ threat to his life, 
to engage in an act morally repulsive to him, lacks the requisite mens rea to commit a 
crime.” Advisory Opinion, supra note 99, at 9. 
127 See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 38, ¶ 64. 
128 See id. 
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C. A Per Se Bar to Asylum for Child Soldiers Ignores Traditional Notions of 
Infancy and Duress as a Basis for Finding Diminished Responsibility  
for Children Who Commit Bad Acts 
 Recent studies demonstrate that “critical areas in the brain[’s] 
[frontal lobes] used for making judgments and comprehending com-
plex concepts like safety and freedom are not fully developed” until 
people are in their twenties.129 These studies confirm “a long-held, 
common sense view: teenagers are not the same as adults in a variety of 
key areas such as the ability to make sound judgments when confronted 
by complex situations, the capacity to control impulses, and the ability 
to plan effectively.”130 Ahead of this scientific curve, the Supreme Court 
has long recognized that “[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial 
recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are 
less mature and responsible than adults.”131 In particular, the Court has 
noted the “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsi-
bility” in youth, that the young are “more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures,” and that “the character of a 
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”132 Such considera-
tions lead to the conclusion that “[t]heir own vulnerability and com-
parative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juve-
niles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to 
escape negative influences in their whole environment.”133 
 The idea that children should also be held to a lesser degree of 
responsibility than adults is reflected in the various sections of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA) that exempt children from other-
wise generally applicable provisions.134 For example, the totalitarian 
party membership ground of inadmissibility has an age-based excep-
                                                                                                                      
129 See Don Vereen, Research Shows Consequences of Drug Abuse on the Teenage Brain, 14 Chal-
lenge, No. 3, 2007, at 1, http://www.thechallenge.org/challenge_14_3.pdf; see also Catherine 
Sebastian, The Second Decade: What Can We Do About the Adolescent Brain?, 2 Opticon 1826, at 2 
(2007), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/opticon1826/archive/issue2/VfPLIFE_Teenagers.pdf (reporting 
that “the most profound differences between adults and adolescents occur at the decision-
making, or executive, levels of processing” and that adolescents are more likely than adults to 
engage in risky behavior). 
130 Daniel R. Weinberger, Brita Elvevåg & Jay N. Giedd, The Adolescent Brain: A Work in 
Progress, Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 19 ( June 2005), http://www.the 
nationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/BRAIN.pdf. 
131 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982). 
132 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
133 Id. at 570. 
134 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii), 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), 1227(a)(3)(D)(ii), 
1227(a)(6)(B) (2006). 
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tion.135 Further, the Attorney General has interpreted various sections 
of otherwise general provisions of the INA such that those sections do 
not apply to children under eighteen years of age.136 For example, the 
Board has held that juvenile delinquency determinations do not fall 
within criminal grounds of removal, even though no such exemption 
exists in the statute.137 In the asylum context, the one year filing dead-
line for asylum applications makes no exception for children, but the 
regulations excuse unaccompanied minors.138 
 In addition to their underdeveloped brains and lack of maturity, 
child soldiers present the mitigating factor of extreme, life threatening 
duress.139 Almost every U.S. jurisdiction recognizes duress as a defense 
to criminal culpability.140 The common law also excuses criminal acts 
performed under threat of “imminent death or serious bodily in-
jury.”141 To establish the defense of duress, a defendant must show that: 
(1) he “was under an unlawful and imminent threat of such a nature as 
to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily in-
jury;” (2) he “had not recklessly or negligently placed [him]self in a 
                                                                                                                      
135 See id. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii) (providing for exception where alien was under sixteen 
years of age or where membership was for purposes of obtaining employment, food, or 
other essentials for living). Admittedly, that Congress created an age-based exception in 
this provision and not in the persecutor bar indicates that Congress was aware of age con-
siderations and chose to omit them. Compare id., with id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (excluding from 
refugee protection those found to have persecuted others regardless of the age of the ap-
plicant). 
136 See, e.g., In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 1365 (B.I.A. 2000). 
137 See id. at 1365–66. 
138 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2010). Similarly, a child does not accumulate unlaw-
ful presence for purposes of the ten-year bar until after he or she turns eighteen. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I). Further, asylum officers must follow a set of specific 
“Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims” applicable to children under eighteen. See Me-
morandum from Jeff Weiss, Acting Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, to Asylum Officer Corps on 
INS Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims 3 (Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.abanet.org/ 
publicserv/immigration/ins_guidelines_for_children.pdf. 
139 See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 38, ¶¶ 1–5; see also Happold, supra note 13, at 85. 
140 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-3-30 (2005); Alaska Stat. § 11.81.440 (2008); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13-412 (2010); Cal. Penal Code § 26 (West 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-708 
(2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14 (2009); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 431 (2007); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 16-3-26 (2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702-231 (2009); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-8 (2008); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 501.090 (LexisNexis 2008); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 562.071 (2000); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:2-9 (West 2005); N.Y. Penal Law § 40.00 (McKinney 2009); N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 12.1-05-10 (1997); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 156 (2006); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.270 (2009); 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 309 (West 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (2006); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. § 8.05 (West 2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (LexisNexis 2008); Wash. Rev. 
Code § 9A.16.060 (2010); Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (2008); 9 Guam Code Ann. § 7.61 (2005). 
141 See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 97, at 491; 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal 
Law 240 (14th ed. 1978). 
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situation in which it was probable that [he] would be forced to perform 
the criminal conduct;” (3) he “had no reasonable, legal alternative to 
violating the law;” and (4) there was “a direct causal relationship . . . 
between the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm.”142 
The plight of child soldiers easily satisfies these elements. 
 In her landmark comprehensive study of the impact of armed con-
flict on children, Graça Machel reported that children are valued as 
soldiers because they are “‘more obedient, do not question orders and 
are easier to manipulate than adult soldiers.’”143 Machel further re-
ported, “Child soldiers are recruited in many different ways. Some are 
conscripted, others are press-ganged or kidnapped and still others are 
forced to join armed groups to defend their families.”144 Though many 
children “present themselves for service[,] [i]t is misleading, however, 
to consider this voluntary.”145 Children may volunteer because it may be 
the only way to assure food, shelter, and protection.146 Another com-
mentator has noted, “Children who grow up in war zones might not see 
any positive place for themselves in society; in their situations they are 
oppressed, have little or no access to education, feel powerless and 
alienated, and have been denied positive life options.”147 Others are 
caught up in a cycle of violence spurred on by “revenge [because of the 
murder of a relative], the conviction to continue the struggles of lost 
loved ones, the need to substitute an annihilated family or social struc-
ture, and the desire to take control over events that shape one’s cir-
                                                                                                                      
142 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
143 Graça Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, ¶ 34, transmitted by Note of the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. Doc. A/ 51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Machel Report] (quoting 
Rachel Brett et al., Children: The Invisible Soldiers 88 (1996)). Other commenta-
tors have noted that child soldiers are both “expendable and exploitable” and “can be 
turned into the fiercest fighters.” Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 78, at 27, 93. In 
1993, the U.N. General Assembly, “[p]rofoundly concerned about the grievous deteriora-
tion in the situation of children in many parts of the world as a result of armed conflicts,” 
authorized the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint an expert “to undertake a comprehen-
sive study of this question, including the participation of children in armed conflict.” G.A. 
Res. 48/157, pmbl., ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/157 (Mar. 7, 1994). The Secretary-General 
appointed Machel, and the General Assembly accepted her report on August 26, 1996. See 
Machel Report, supra, ¶ 1. 
144 Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 36. Forced recruitment usually involves “the 
threat or actual violation of the physical integrity of the youth or someone close to him or 
her, [which] is practised by both armed opposition groups and national armed forces.” 
Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 78, at 24. Children in refugee camps are at particularly 
high risk for recruitment. See Wessells, supra note 110, at 25, 37–38. 
145 Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 38. 
146 See id. ¶ 39. 
147 Wessells, supra note 110, at 3. 
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cumstances.”148 Ideology and susceptibility to propaganda may also 
provide a hard-to-resist incentive.149 During the Iran-Iraq war, for ex-
ample, thousands of children died in combat after being told that par-
ticipating in a holy war guaranteed access to heaven.150 
 Once recruited, however, child soldiers are subjected to brutal in-
duction ceremonies in which attempts are made to harden children 
emotionally by punishing those who offer help or display feelings for 
others subjected to abuse.151 Children are often beaten up and con-
tinuously exposed to scenes of violence so that they do not question the 
authority of the adults in the group; sometimes they are even forced to 
kill captives or their own family members.152 Typically, armed groups 
use a child’s participation in killing as a method of control and to “cut 
child recruits off from their former lives, rupturing their bonds with 
family and community.”153 Forced participation in killing is also utilized 
to condition the children to violence, so that they experience “as nor-
mal what most people would regard as abnormal.” 154 Armed groups 
often use “cannibalistic practices such as forcing children to drink the 
blood of those who had been killed” to condition and reduce the fear 
of children in combat.155 Additionally, many armed groups require 
drug use, whereby the children’s “‘crazy’ behavior becomes a combat 
                                                                                                                      
148 Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 78, at 32; see Why Children Join, Coal. to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/why-children-
join (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
149 See Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 49. 
150 See Maryam Elahi, The Rights of the Child Under Islamic Law: Prohibition of the Child Sol-
dier, 19 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 259, 278 (1988). The force of ideology and propaganda 
cannot be understated. See, e.g., id. In 2007, the Nobel Prize-winning author Günter Grass 
surprised the world when he confessed to having served in the Waffen S.S. during World 
War II, albeit for a brief period in which he never fired a shot. See Günter Grass, How I 
Spent the War, New Yorker, June 4, 2007, at 68. According to Grass: “What I did cannot be 
put down to youthful folly. No pressure from above.” Id. Yet, he relayed a tragicomic story 
of how he had been compelled to serve in the largely youth-based home defense Luftwaffe 
Auxiliary at age fifteen; he stated, “Rabidly pubescent, we considered ourselves the main-
stays of the home front.” Id. There, he was “a pushover for the prettified black-and-white 
‘truth’” served up by the newsreels. Id. at 70. When he was finally called up for duty at the 
front at age seventeen and assigned to the Waffen S.S., he stated, “There is nothing carved 
into the onion skin of my memory that can be read as a sign of shock, let alone horror.” Id. 
at 74. He continued, “I most likely viewed the Waffen S.S. as an elite unit that was sent into 
action whenever a breach in the front line had to be stopped up.” Id. 
151 See Wessells, supra note 110, at 59–71; see also Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 44. 
152 See Wessells, supra note 110, at 64–75; see also Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 44. 
153 Wessells, supra note 110, at 59. 
154 Id. at 57. 
155 Id. at 75. 
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ritual through which [they] demonstrate their machismo in a deadly 
mixture of fearlessness and uncontrolled violence.”156 
 Needless to say, serving as a child soldier “affects all aspects of 
child development—physical, mental, and emotional.”157 But as Dr. Mi-
chael Wessells has noted, it would be a mistake to believe that such an 
experience has damaged the child beyond repair.158 He states: 
One of the most prevalent images is that child soldiers are 
damaged goods. One sees images of a lost generation, of tee-
nagers who not only lost their childhood and opportunity for 
education, but also their chance for proper moral develop-
ment. These images portray youth as not just perpetrators but 
hardened killers who can never go home. The evidence now 
available, although it is not highly systematic, indicates the 
contrary. The majority of former child soldiers are resilient, 
not damaged, and able to reintegrate into civilian life with va-
rying degrees of success. It is a disservice to these young peo-
ple to suggest otherwise. Although there are dysfunctions that 
must be addressed, their resilience far outweighs any dysfunc-
tion.159 
 Carefully designed Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegra-
tion (DDR) programs that have made special provisions for child sol-
diers involving counseling, health screening, transition planning, and 
family reunification have been able to successfully reintegrate former 
combatants back into their communities.160 To that end, the United 
States has contributed over ten million dollars through the Agency for 
International Development “to international programs aimed at pre-
venting the recruitment of children and reintegrating child ex-
combatants into society.”161 
                                                                                                                      
156 Id. at 76–77. 
157 See Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 166. 
158 See Michael Wessells, Psychosocial Issues in Reintegrating Child Soldiers, 37 Cornell 
Int’l L.J. 513, 515 (2004). 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 518–25. Machel noted that in many instances, reunification with commu-
nity and family is simply impossible. See Machel Report, supra note 143, ¶ 52. This is par-
ticularly true for girls who served as child soldiers and who, during their service, were 
raped or had children by their comrades. See id. ¶ 51. For these young victims, reaccep-
tance into the community is particularly hard because they are no longer suitable for mar-
riage under traditional norms. See id. 
161 U.S. Report on the Optional Protocol, supra note 18, ¶¶ 34–35. 
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III. A Method for Applying the Persecutor Bar to Child Soldiers 
 During the Negusie oral argument, Justice Alito asked “[h]ow 
would the balancing be struck” to determine when a lack of personal 
culpability would excuse the application of the persecutor bar.162 Immi-
gration judges regularly make such determinations based on a case-by-
case evaluation of a person’s moral fiber and worthiness to remain in 
the United States.163 In the context of removal based on criminal con-
victions for example, the BIA has established a workable system of bal-
ancing the seriousness of the alien’s criminal misconduct against the 
equities presented in the individual’s case.164 There is no reason to 
think that immigration judges would be any less capable of making sim-
ilar determinations in the context of child soldiers. 
 In light of a number of a factors, including: (1) the prohibition 
against recruitment of those under fifteen contained in the CRC; (2) 
the ICC’s codification of the recruitment of those under fifteen as a war 
crime; and (3) the Optional Protocol’s bar to recruitment of fifteen-
year-olds, if a person’s conduct occurred when the before he or she 
turned fifteen, then he or she cannot be held morally accountable for 
his or her actions.165 This conclusion is just as strong today as it was dur-
ing the formation of the Special Court of Sierra Leone.166 Thus, the 
persecutor bar should not apply to those under sixteen.167 For those 
who served at age sixteen or seventeen, the burden remains on the 
government to show that the child soldier’s conduct rose to the level of 
persecution.168 
 Next, any analysis must account for the fact that child soldiers per-
form many non-combat functions. These include “laying mines and ex-
plosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, 
drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, 
                                                                                                                      
162 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 
07-499). 
163 See, e.g., In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 583 (B.I.A. 1978). 
164 See id. at 584–85. 
165 See Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi); CRC, supra note 10, art. 38(2); 
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 77(2). 
166 See Sierra Leone Special Court Report, supra note 86, ¶ 15(c). 
167 See id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi); CRC, supra note 10, 
art. 38(2); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 77(2). 
168 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2010) (“If the evidence indicates that one or more of the 
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cooking and domestic labour . . . [and] sexual slavery.”169 These are not 
acts of persecution. Drawing on the Fedorenko Court’s observation that 
the Jewish prisoners in Treblinka who were assigned tasks that formed a 
part of the daily workings at the death camp could not be considered to 
have assisted in the persecution of others, the test for the application of 
the persecutor bar to child soldiers must consider that child soldiers as-
signed to non-combat tasks forming part of the daily routine of a mili-
tary organization did not engage in persecution of others.170 
 Where a child soldier who, at age sixteen or seventeen, engaged in 
conduct that would be deemed persecution, the Board should take 
heed of the Hernandez analysis and, in a manner consistent with Article 
1F of the Refugee Convention, require immigration judges to weigh fac-
tors such as whether the child soldier was conscripted or volunteered; 
adopted the persecutory goals of the group; received any benefits, re-
ward, or promotion for service; length of service; rank; opportunities to 
escape; and whether the he or she was forthcoming with information.171 
 Two Canadian cases illustrate this analysis.172 First, in Ramirez v. 
Canada, the court upheld the application of the exclusion clause to an 
asylum applicant who had served in the Salvadoran army for two and a 
half years starting at age seventeen and then deserted.173 Ramirez had 
enlisted voluntarily, re-enlisted after two years, rose to the rank of ser-
geant, fought in excess of one hundred engagements, and witnessed the 
torture and killing of many prisoners.174 Despite Ramirez’s assertion that 
he deserted the army after an ideological conversion, the court held: 
[Ramirez] could never be classed as a simple on-looker, but 
was on all occasions a participating and knowing member of a 
military force, one of whose common objectives was the tor-
ture of prisoners to extract information. This was one of the 
things his army did, regularly and repeatedly, as he admitted. 
He was a part of the operation, even if he personally was in no 
sense a “cheering section.” In other words, his presence at this 
                                                                                                                      
169 Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, Coal. to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 411 
(2008), http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/files/country_pdfs/FINAL_2008_Global_Re- 
port.pdf. 
170 See Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2001) (construing Fedorenko v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)). 
171 See id. at 814. 
172 See Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration) (1993), 107 D.L.R. 4th 
424, 424–25 (Can. F.C.A.); Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration) (1992), 
89 D.L.R. 4th 173, 182–87 (Can. F.C.A.). 
173 See Ramirez, 89 D.L.R. 4th at 182–87. 
174 See id. 
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number of incidents of persecution, coupled with his sharing 
in the common purpose of the military forces, clearly consti-
tutes complicity.175 
 By way of contrast, in Moreno v. Canada, the court held that the ex-
clusion clause should not apply where the applicant had been forcibly 
conscripted into the Salvadoran army at sixteen years old, served only 
four months, participated in only five armed conflicts in which civilians 
were killed, stood guard outside a locked cell where a prisoner was tor-
tured, and deserted as soon as his family was able to raise the money for 
his escape.176 According to the court, “A person forcibly conscripted 
into the military and who on one occasion witnesse[d] the torture of a 
prisoner while on assigned guard duty cannot be considered at law to 
have committed a crime against humanity.”177 
Conclusion 
 It is now well established that by enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, 
Congress intended to bring U.S. law into conformity with the 1967 
United Nations Refugee Protocol and aligned the United States with 
the international approach to the treatment of refugees.178 The imposi-
tion of a per se bar to child soldiers seeking asylum contravenes the in-
ternational and domestic efforts to protect child soldiers. Worse, it ef-
fectively cuts off an important avenue of escape for child soldiers, 
emboldens the warlords that enslave them with the knowledge that the 
children have nowhere to turn for protection, and unduly stigmatizes 
the children at a time when they most need help for recovery and re-
habilitation. Given the circumstances under which they are held and 
compelled to serve, as well as the wide recognition of the diminished 
culpability of youth, child soldiers should be able to argue that their 
conduct falls beyond the scope and intent of the persecutor bar. 
                                                                                                                      
175 Id. at 187–88. 
176 See Moreno, 107 D.L.R. 4th at 424–25. 
177 Id. at 425. 
178 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987). See generally Refugee Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). Like the prohibition against torture, the prohibition against refoulement to per-
secution is an accepted principle of customary international law, which nations accept as a 
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